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SOME COMMENTS ON BURDELL v. CANADIAN
PACIFIC AIRLINES

Andreas F. Lowenfeld*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Frank Burdell was the Far Eastern representative of
an American heavy-equipment company, stationed in Singapore.
At the end of February 1966, Burdell traveled to Tokyo on a
Singapore-Bangkok-Hong Kong-Tokyo and return ticket, purchased
in Singapore from Cathay Pacific but using Canadian Pacific
Airlines for the Hong Kong-Tokyo portion of the journey.
Canadian Pacific's flight 402 from Hong Kong to Tokyo on March
4, 1966, arrived over Tokyo in a fog, circled for about an
hour, finally came in to land, and crashed into the rearwall
at the end of the runway killing its crew of ten and all but
ten of its sixty-two passengers, including Burdell. Burdell
was 40 years old at the time of his death and was earning
about $15,000 per year. He left a wife, Lois, aged 32, and
three children, 18, 9, and 7 years old.
Shortly after the accident, Mrs. Burdell and her
children returned to the United States, and in due course
they brought suit against Canadian Pacific Airlines in the
Circuit Coyrt, Cook County, Illinois, Judge Nicholas J. Bua
presiding.
Canadian Pacific had an office in Chicago, and was
properly served. Apparently the suit was commenced before
the statute of limitations of any possible jurisdiction had
run. Apart from these two points, everything else was confusion. This Comment takes up some of the issues raised in a
long and in some ways surprising opinion of Judge Nicholas J.
Bua in the Circuit Court, .Cook County, Illinois, November 7,
1968.
II.
A.

WARSAW CONVENTION ISSUES IN BURDELL

Was This a Suit Within the Warsaw Convention?

The Convention for the unification of certain rules
relating to international transportation by air, commonly
known as the Warsaw Convention, establishes a complex
*Professor of Law, New York University
iBurdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, No. 66 L 10799,
(Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill., 1968), reported in 8 INT'L LEGAL
MATER. 83 (1968).

framework of rights and liabilities between passengers and
carriers in international transportation. 2 The best known,
though as we shall see not the only feature of the Warsaw
system, is the limit on recovery in most cases of $8,300 per
passenger. To come under the definition of international
transportation to which the Convention applies (Article I),
a voyage must involve transportation between the territories
of two contracting parties or a round trip to and from the
territory of a contracting party, with an agreed stopping
place outside the territory of that party. Canadian Pacific
argued that what was involved was a series of separate flights,
so that the Hong Kong-Tokyo leg would be the test of whether
the Convention applied.

The Court - properly, in my view -

dismissed this argument. Under Article I (3) of the Warsaw
Convention, transportation, even though performed by successive
carriers, is deemed to be one individual transportation if so
regarded by the parties. Holding this transportation to be a
Singapore origin - Singapore destination contract of carriage
seems consistent with prevailing interpretations of Article I
of the Warsaw Convention.
The argument about whether Singapore was the point of
application of the Convention was important because there
was doubt about whether Singapore was a party to the Convention. While Singapore was part of the British Empire it was
clearly covered by the Convention. In July, 1963, Singapore,
along with former British colonies of North Borneo and
Sarawak became part of the Federation of Malayia, which shortly
thereafter changed its name to Malaysia. The Federation of
Malayia, upon gaining its independence in 1957, had assumed
the rights and obligations of treaties entered into between
the United Kingdom and other states "insofar as such instruments may be held to have application to or in respect of
the Federation of Malaya." Thus the Warsaw Convention applied
to Malaysia in 1963; furthermore, when Singapore became part
of the Federation, Malaysia assumed the treaty rights and
obligations of the new components, including Singapore, again
presumably including the Warsaw Convention.
In 1965 Singapore seceded from Malaysia and became an
independent and sovereign state, once more with a provision
(annexed to the Independence of Singapore agreement) providing
1 ... any treaty, agreement or convention entered into before
Singapore Day between the Yang de Pertuan Agong or the Government
2Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Transportation by Air opened for signature
October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11,
reprinted with 1955 Protocol in HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND
ASTRONAUTICS, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., AIR LAWS AND TREATIES OF
THE WORLD 1332 (Comm. Print 1961). A lengthy account of the
development of the United States Warsaw Convention policy
appears in Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn].

of Malaysia and another country or countries, including
those deemed to be so by (the provision in Malaysia's
Constitution referred to above) shall insofar as such
instruments have application to Singapore be deemed to be
a treaty

.

. . between Singapore and that country or

countries."
The Illinois court could have discovered all
of this by reading with some care the publication Treaties
in Force issued annually by the United States State Department .
The court had that publication before it, but looking only in the multilateral section, it did not find
Singapore's name on the list of the Warsaw Convention parties.
Though the State Department's Deputy Legal Adviser wrote to
the court that the Department considered Singapore to be an
adherent to the Convention, the judge did not believe him.
He preferred to rely on a letter from the Vice Director of
the Legal and Treaty Department of Poland, (the depository
of the Convention) stating that that Government had not received notification of Singapore's adherence to the Warsaw
Convention. The court held that Singapore was not a party
to the Convention at the time of the accident.
I have some sympathy with Judge Bua's problem here.
Before the United States served notice of denunciation of the
Warsaw Convention in November 1965, one of my tasks, as a
State Department official, was to arrange for consultations
with as many of our Convention partners as possible about
the United States course of action. Assembling an accurate
list of which countries this would involve proved most difficult. The International Civil Aviation Organization, the
Government of Poland, and the State Department's Treaty
Branch all had different lists, and it developed that a
number of recently independent countries simply had never
focused on the question of whether they did or did not intend
to keep this particular Convention in effect by way of state
succession. Nevertheless, I think Judge Bua erred here, on
two grounds. First, it would seem to me that an official
communication from the State Department ought to be conclusive
in a court in the United States on the question of whether a
given country is or is not a party to a treaty of which the
United States is a party. Second, I believe the record of
state succession as recited above is conclusive in the absence
of a declaration by Singapore that it intends not to be bound.
Thus it seems that Mr. Burdell's flight was a Warsaw flight,
on the basis of origin and destination in Singapore.
The decision about Singapore's membership in Warsaw
could have disposed of the case. But Judge Bua, apparently not
confident on this point, proceeded to address a number of other
possible issues, many of them not even pleaded.
3 DEP'T

STATE, 1967 TREATIES IN FORCE 131 (Malaysia),
176 (Singapore). 1968 TREATIES IN FORCE 253, lists Singapore
as a member of the Warsaw Convention, though with a footnote
indicating some uncertainty. 1969 TREATIES IN FORCE 263,
lists Singapore as a member, with a footnote referring to the
instruments cited in the text.

B.

Could Suit Be Brought in Chicago?

Canadian Pacific argued that though it was personally
amenable to suit in Illinois, under the Convention this
claim could not be heard there. It may be asked what difference it would make to Canadian Pacific, since the Convention
prescribed a limit of liability of $8,300 wherever suit was
brought. The answer is that Canadian Pacific knew very well
why it wanted to avoid the Cook County Court, or indeed any
court in the United States, though Canadian Pacific probably
did not reckon with Judge Bua's view of the Convention. By
now airlines are accustomed to a variety of techniques used
by courts in the United States to escape from the Convention-from the issue of ticket delivery, 4 to the small print giving
notice of the liability limit, 5 to findings of wilful misconduct in what ordinarily would be considered at best gross
negligence.6
Understandably, Canadian Pacific moved to dismiss
under Article 28 of the Convention. The airline was right -Article 28 of the Convention says that an action for damages
must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties at one of
four places:
(1) the domicile of the carrier - here Canada
(2) the carrier's principal place of business likewise Canada
(3) the place of business of the carrier through
which the contract was made - not so clear
but probably Singapore, on the theory that
Cathay Pacific was acting as Canadian Pacific's
agent and thus pro tanto Canadian Pacific was
maintaining a place of business in Singapore
(4) the place of destination - here Singapore, if
we accept the round trip theory discussed above.
Illinois was not one of the places where suit
might be brought under Article 28.
I have always considered Article 28 one of the Convention's most objectionable provisions. I can see no reason
why a United States citizen flying Frankfurt-New York and
return who crashes in New York should not bring suit in New
York. The carrier does business in New York, the witnesses
are there, the plaintiff or his survivors may be domiciled
there or nearby.

But the Convention says

no .7

If the

4 Mertens

v. Flying Tiger Lines, 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.
1965); Warren v. Flying Tiger Lines, 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.
1965). 5 Lisi v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A., 370 F.2d
508

(2d Cir. 1966).
6 E.g., Pekelis
v. Transcontinental and Western Air Inc.,
187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1951); Le Roy v. Sabena Belgian World
Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965).
7See Bowen v. Port of New York Authority, 8 Av.Cas. 18,
043

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).

Warsaw Convention is ever renegotiated, I would hope Article
28 would be drastically revised or perhaps eliminated
altogether. Meanwhile, it seems clear that in the Burdell
case, even though the widow and children were domiciled in
Chicago and Canadian Pacific had an office therQ, the Warsaw
Convention limited suit to Singapore or Canada.6 Judge Bua,
at least by inference, accepted this conclusion. It was one
reason for his determination that the Convention was unconstitutional.
What Was the Applicable Limit of Damages Under
the Convention?
The Warsaw Convention limits the liability of a carrier to a passenger to 125,000 "Poincare' francs," which was
not quite $5,000 when the Convention was drafted in 1929 and
was equal to just under $8,300 since the devaluation of the
dollar in 1933. Needless to say, this figure is wholly out
of line with modern concepts of accident compensation, not
only in the United States but in most other developed
countries. Because of this fact, the United States served
notice of denunciation of the Convention on November 15,
1965, to take effect (under Article 39) six months later,
on May 15, 1966. 9 On the eve of the effective date, the
United States withdrew its denunciation, in return for an
interim arrangement whereby all major carriers agreed by
contract filed with the C.A.B. that as to travel to, from,
or through the United States the limit of liability would
be $75,000 per passenger, and liability would be enforced
without reference to fault on the part of the carrier. 1 0
Canadian Pacific became a party to the so-called
Montreal Agreement, but it would not have helped Burdell.
Not only did the accident take place prior to the effective
date of the Montreal Agreement, but also Burdell's ticket
did not call for travel to, from, or through the United
States. This gap was recognized at the time, but was agreed
to in the hope that the Montreal Agreement would soon become
world-wide in scope. 1 1 Thus far that step has not yet taken
place, though the receptivity to igher limits than the Warsaw
figures appears to be spreading.1 2 In any event, as we have
said, for Burdell's survivors all this would be no comfort.
C.

UFor a more thorough discussion of the origin and
application of Article 28, see Lownefeld & Mendelsohn 522-526.
953 DEP'T STATE BULL. 923 (1965).
1054 DEP'T STATE BULL. 955-57 (1966); CAB Press Release
66-61 May 13, 1966; 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
ilSee Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, 597-99.
1 2 See, e.g.,
Report of Subcommittee on Revision of the
Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol, ICAO Doc.
No. LC/SC Warsaw Rep. 9-12-68. The September 1969 meeting of
the Legal Subcommittee of ICAO did not come up with an agreed
plan, and its documentation has not at this writing been released. However, the discussion proceeded to a large extent
on modified versions of the Montreal Interim Agreement, that
is with a limit of liability in the range $100,000-125,000 per
passenger, absolute liability, and some incentive for the carrier to settle with the passenger prior to trial.

The plaintiffs might have had another escape. Under
Article 25 of the Convention, the liability limit does not
apply "if the damage is caused by [the carrier's] wilful
misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance
with the law of the Court to which the case is submitted, is
considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct." As one
might guess from reading the quoted words, the standard of
wilful misconduct has been most troublesome. Since Article
25 itself refers to the law of the forum on this issue,
nothing approaching a uniform standard has been attained. On
the basis of the limited description of the facts contained
in the court's statement, it is my guess that wilful misconduct could have been found in this case. I am not aware,
however, that any other passenger has prevailed under a wilful misconduct theory in claims arising out of this accident,
even where, because of different ticket arrangements, it was
possible to bring suit in the United States. In any event,
to prove wilful misconduct would have required a full and
elaborate trial with no assurance of the outcome. The most
probable result would have been a settlement slightly above
the $8,300 limit. Judge Bua, without addressing the Montreal
Agreement or the possibility of a wilful misconduct recovery-indeed without any pleading by Canadian Pacific involving
the limit-- held the Convention unconstitutional on the
limitation of liability ground as well.
III.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION

I must confess that in several years of considerable
attention to the Warsaw Convention in all its ramifications,
first as a government official and subsequently as a law
teacher, it never occurred to me that the Convention could
be held unconstitutional. I knew this had been tried once
before in connection with a claim arising out of the same
accident as the Jane Froman case in the forties. 1 3 The losing attorney had written his frustrations up in a book, contending that the Convention deprived his client of the right
to a jury trial in violation of the Seventh Amendment. 1 4 *
But to have a judge actually repudiate a treaty which had had
hundreds of cases decided under it, and had twice in the past
year been presented to the Supreme Court, (though neither
time with a clear expression from that Court) 1 5 struck me by
surprise. I would examine the question in two parts.
1 3Lee

v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 275 App. Div. 855,
89 N.Y.S.2d 888 (2d Dept. 1949).
For the case involving Jane
Froman, see Ross v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 299 N.Y. 88,
85 N.E.2d 880 (1949).
14H. SHERMAN, THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
(1952).
1 5 Block v. Compagnie
Nationale Air France, 392 U.S. 905
(1968), denying cert. to 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967) (upheld
defense under the Warsaw Convention in case involving charter
flight); Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Lisi, 390 U.S.
455 (1968), aff'g 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966).

A.

Can Any Treaty Be Declared Unconstitutional?

In the past, there has been some doubt on this score,
primarily because of some rather uncharacteristic rumination
In
by Justice Holmes in the famous migratory bird case. 1
federal
to
enjoin
sought
of
Missouri
State
that case, the
enforcement of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, on the ground
that that Act dealt with matters reserved to the states under
the Tenth Amendment. The argument was that the federal government cannot, through the treaty power, acquire powers it does
not otherwise possess. After.first pointing out the difference
between Acts of Congress, which are the supreme law only when
made pursuant to the Constitution, whereas treaties are supreme
law when made under authority of the United States, the Court
quickly added, "We do not mean to imply that there are no
qualifications to the treaty-making power." If a treaty contained "any prohibitory words found in the constitution," as
contrasted with "some invisible radiation from the general
terms of the Tenth Amendment," then it would be unconstitutional
17
and could, presumably, be voided by the Supreme Court.
The confusion engendered by a too rapid reading of
Missouri v. Holland, plus some vague language in two cases
arising out of the Litvinov Assignment of 193318 spurred the
controversy over the Bricker Amendment in the 1950's which
(1) would have expressly stated that "a provision of a treaty
which conflicts with the Constitution shall not be of any
force and effect," and (2) would have provided that "a treaty
shall become effective as internal law ... only through legisla-

tion which would be valid in absence of treaty."
The Bricker Amendment narrowly failed of adoption. I
believe it clear, however, that the first goal of the Amendment corresponds to existing law. Thus if a treaty provision
conflicts with a prohibition in the Constitution, it is void.
For example, a prohibition on hate propaganda, as has been
suggested in numerous proposals made in the United Nations,
would almost certainly be void under the First Amendment's
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press, notwithstanding the fact that the First Amendment reads "Congress shall
make no law .'. .."

In Reid v. Covert 1 9

(though the specific

issue involved an executive agreement and not a treaty) the
Supreme Court made this position completely clear. The verbal
distinction alluded to by Justice Holmes, it explained, related
only to the desire to maintain in effect treaties, including
the Peace Treaty of 1783, made by the United States prior to
the Constitution. "It would be completely anomalous to
0 say
4
Constitution.'
the
with
comply
not
need
treaty
a
that
16Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
17252 U.S. 416, 433-34.
18United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
19354 U.S. 1 (1957).
20Id.at 17-18.

B.

Is the Warsaw Convention Unconstitutional?

Judge Bua considered that both the provision of the
Convention that would restrict the right of plaintiffs to
bring suit in the United States and the provision relating
to limitation on damages were "arbitrary, irresponsible,
capricious and indefensible" and that they violated the due
process and equal protection clauses of the United States
Constitution. What, he asked, if 125,000 Poincard francs
were now worth only one dollar? Or what if the Convention
provided that all suits must be brought in Warsaw, Poland?
This set of rhetorical questions seems to me an inadequate
substitute for constitutional analysis. On that basis, for
example, any limitation of recovery in wrongful death actions
could be similarly assailed. While the trend in the United
States is away from such limitations, a number of states still
have them, and none, so far as this writer knows, have ever
been declared unconstitutional. 2 1 Indeed, until August 1967 -after the accident that took Mr. Burdell's life -- Illinois
had the lwest wrongful death limit in the United States:
$30,000."
Absent.the Warsaw Convention, presumably Mr.
Burdell's widow would be bound by that limit. In sustaining
the earlier limitations, the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
The legislature took away no right when it enacted
the statute. It created both the right and the
remedy, and we think that its power to limit the
maximum recovery in the action that it created can
not be questioned. The fact that most States place
no limit upon the amount recoverable, or that the
legislative limit may seem unduly low when contrasted
with recoveries in other actions, does not affect the
power of2 3 the legislature, or the validity of its
action.
Whether, similarly, the Warsaw Convention created a cause
of action is debatable. 2 4 It is now true, if it was not when
21Some state constitutions do, however, contain express
prohibitions against limits on recovery in wrongful death
actions. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 18, S 6; ARK. CONST.
art. 5, § 32; KY. CONST. S 54; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, S 16; OHIO
CONST. art. 1, S 19a; OKLA. CONST. art. 23, S 7; PA. CONST.
art. 3, S 18; UTAH CONST. art. 16, § 5; WYO. CONST. art. 10,
§4.
2270 ILL. ANN. STAT. S 2,
as amended, M.B. 626, § 2,
(1967) Ill. Laws, 75th Gen. Ass., approved August 18, 1967. The
amendment provides that only deaths occurring aft.er the effective
date will be free from the limitation.
2 3 Hall v.
Gillins, 13 Ill. 2d 26, 29, 147 N.E. 2d 352, 354
2
4
(1958). Two cases in the United States held that the Convention
did not create a cause of action. Noel v. Linea Aeropostal
Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957); Komlos v. Compagnie
Nationale Air France, 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on
other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953).
For a forceful argument that these cases were wrong, see Calkins, The Cause of
Action under the Warsaw Convention, 26 J. AIR L. & COM. 217,
323

(1959).

-

the Convention was drafted, that nearly every country in
the world has some form of damage action maintainable against
a carrier, whether in the nature of a tort or a contract claim.
It may be more correct to say that the Convention regulates the
choice of forum, the standard and burden of proof, the period
of limitation, and the measure of damages in claims between
passengers (or shippers) and carriers than that it actively
"creates" a cause of action.
But the argument in defense of the Convention does not
rest on the concept of a grant, which, as the Illinois Supreme
Court argues, may be limited if the grantor so chooses. The
argument in favor of constitutionality of the Convention simply
is that a limit on liability, especially when coupled with some
arrangements about standards of liability and burden of proof
of fault, is within the legitimate scope governmental regulation.
However antiquated the amounts in Warsaw are, it would be most
unfortunate, in my view, to sustain Judge Bua's contention that
a damages limitation violates some concept of "substantive due
process." Quite apart from air accidents, I think it is fair
to say that we have not yet found an adequate system of accident
compensation in the United States. Principles developed in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in England and America do
not really work in the twentiety century. I do not know
whether the ultimate solution is state insurance, automatic
compensation, elimination of fault, comparative negligence,
or some other plan. I would hope the legislatures, the Congress,
and in the international area the countries of the world would
experiment. One such experiment, mentioned earlier, is the
Montreal Agreement, which combines a substantially higher limit
with absolute liability. Doubtless that experiment too will
have to be modified. But with no articulated standard, with
no political mandate , for any court to strike down a system of
accident compensation that includes a limit on liability, however
obsolete, seems to me to be a misuse of the Constitution. It
is worth remembering that if the common law of torts had been
frozen into the Constitution, as Judge Bua would seem to suggest,
repeal of the fellow servant rule and of assumption of risk, to
name but two ancient barbarisms, might have been precluded, as
might, today, the introduction of absolute liability or comparative negligence.
In fairness to Judge Bua, he had some additional points.
Though not relevant to the case before him, he pointed to the
provision in the Convention that applies even to domestic
flights when the passenger holds a ticket including an international portion, so that two passengers siting side by side
are covered by two quite different regimes.-' In a literal
sense, Judge Bua is right in saying that the two passengers are
not receiving equal protection. Similarly, he points out the
anomaly of a low limit applicable to an airline but no limit
applicable to the aircraft manufacturer, though'both may have
contributed to the accident.
2 5 Warsaw

Convention art. 1(3).

Again, my reply is that these criticisms have merit.
But they should, it seems to me, be addressed to the executive
and legislative branches. All laws are, in a sense, discriminatory. Two widows bereaved as a result of airplane crashes, one
caused by pilot error, the other caused by lightning, are also
at present unequally protected, though either loss is the same.
I, for one, would change this so that the carrier would bear
the risk regardless of fault. 2 6 But the arguments for and
against liability without fault are not all on one side, and
it would not occur to me that the Constitution commands the
adoption of my position.
Finally, Judge Bua considers the Warsaw limitation on
place of suit to be unconstitutional. As noted earlier, I
like Article 28 no better than Judge Bua does. It seems to me
that if an international treaty should do anything on this issue,
it should make it easier, not harder, to bring suit. Again,
however, it seems hard for me to equate dislike with constitutional prohibition.
Overall, these brief reactions come down on the side of
Professor Jaffe's warnings against "policy" or "political"
judgments by judges without political mandate.2 7 I would add
only that these warnings seem to me particularly appropriate
when what is involved is an international, and particularly
a multilateral, agreement. It is not that such agreements
are immune from review, or that there is some mystique about
the foreign relations power. It is just that a judge, properly
restrained in reversing political decisions of his own countrymen
in Congress or state legislatures, ought, it seems to me, to be
even more diffident in throwing aside the collective judgment
of countries all around the globe. I would, accordingly find
it quite unfortunate if on the grounds advocated by Judge Bua
or on other grounds the appellate courts of this country would
find the Warsaw Convention unconstitutional.
IV. CONCLUSION: A WORD TO TREATYMAKERS
The Warsaw Convention has never been popular in the United
States. An attempt to double the limits from $8,300 to $16,600
in 1955 never made it through the United States Senate; 2 8 the
notice of denunciation of the Convention in 1965, though not
universally hailed, was probably more popular than the withdrawal of the denunciation in return for the Montreal Agreement
six months later.
My experience has been that the aviation community, in
the United States and particularly abroad, has never fully
appreciated the depth of the hostility in this country to the
Warsaw system. I view Burdell, whatever the detailed criticisms,
as of a piece with Lisi, which held the standard Warsaw ticket
ineffective to give the prescribed notice, and Mertens which went
off on failure to deliver the ticket. 2 9 So long as carriers try
2 6 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn 599-601.
27See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
475-7S8(1965).
See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn 509-516.
29See Lisi v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A., 370
F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Lines, 341 F.2d
851 (2d Cir. 1965).

to keep the print small, the notices hidden, and the amount
of recovery limited, I suspect it will be very difficult to
view any treaty -- including Warsaw or any revision -- as

certain to govern the regime of airplane accident compensation. Until the limit is at least $100,000 with absolute
liability and with the jurisdictional restrictions removed,
but probably closer to $150,000, I doubt very much whether
any new treaty could pass the twin hurdles of the Senate
and the trial courts.

